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BOOK REVIEW
THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE. By Robert E. Rodes, Jr.* Port
Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press. 1976. pp. x, 181. $13.50.
Vincent R. Vasey, S.M.**
This essay in jurisprudence is a well wrought urn created by a
judicious choice of Aristotelian, Thomistic, Existential materials
and much more. Rodes might characterize his synthesis, borrowing
from Tennyson's Ulysses, as a book that is part of all he has met.
And Rodes has met many authors and many people in the course
of years of study and living, individuals motivated by divers convictions and ideals. He has tested what is good and held fast to that
which answered his own aspirations. The book tries to describe, in
the terms of Cicero, what lawyering must be-interest in everything
that touches men in daily life as they meet in social intercourse or
transact affairs.
Those four pillars of Aristotelian and Scholastic thought, the
efficient, material, formal and final causes, provide the structure
upon which Rodes builds his synthesis. Society, the efficient cause,
is the agent which brings about changes in the ordering of itself; the
material cause, that out of which a new being arises, furnishes the
substance out of which the ways and means of social control are
made; the formal cause, the power which determines and energizes,
is justice, moulder of men and institutions; and last of all, the final
cause, the raison d'etre of the entire legal enterprise is man, each
man and all men together.
This abstract philosophical structure, however, has in no way
cabined Rodes. He gives his humanistic leanings full scope. The
book that he offers, therefore, is a readable presentation of what
could have been a heavy and unapproachable subject. He capitalizes on his knack for exemplification, illustrating abstract principles
with examples and cases drawn from various fields of law, as torts,
family, welfare, procedural and constitutional law.
Rodes' basic philosophy is natural law. It does not come as a
Professor, University of Notre Dame Law School. A.B., Brown University, 1947; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1952.
** Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. B.S., University of Dayton, 1936;
M.A., Western Reserve University, 1941; J.C.B., Catholic University of America, 1949;
J.C.L., Lateran University, 1950; J.C.D., Lateran University, 1951; S.T.L., Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1973; S.T.D., Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1974; J.D.,
University of Notre Dame, 1977.
*

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

surprise, then, that he pays homage to discretion under its proper
name, prudence, and refurbishes what old theorists from Aristotle
on called epikia, or rational excuse for not obeying law in a particular instance. Rodes rejects the existence of purely penal laws and,
in so doing, he joins a host of eminent moralists.
To capture the method and spirit of the work, one could cite,
after the manner of Rodes, a Latin maxim, finis primus in intentione, ultimus in exsecutione. Applied here the dictum would mean:
The end and be-all of the legal enterprise is the human person. The
tone of the work is set by the ultimate worth of persons. Such a point
de depart, proper to a natural law philosopher, necessitates recognition for men's intellectual autonomy and elicits sincere reverence for
personal liberty, and leads to the exposition of the legal enterprise
as dialogue.
The kind of government chosen by a particular society evolves
from a dialogue, that is, interaction of historical forces at work
within. These forces weight society in one direction or another, determine the form of government, be it monarchy, dictatorship or
democracy, and create its spirit and character. But whatever be the
modality of government, the legal enterprise, even in the most outrageous expressions of government, must be a rational exercise, an
attempt at explanation of its conduct and of its people. On the other
hand, the people make demands and claims upon government and
the government responds. His predilection for metaphysics does not
keep Rodes from ferreting out of the anti-metaphysician Scandinavian Realists the element of response as one of its important contributions.
Despite his efforts to find what is valid in Analytical Positivism
and Historical and Social Jurisprudence, Rodes faults the various
schools of jurisprudential thought from which he differs as focusing
on either one or the other of the protagonists of the legal dialogue,
rather than on the dialogue itself. Analytical Positivists, for example, concentrate on government and analyze what government does;
Historical Jurisprudence and Scandinavian Realists rivet their attention on the community; American Realists concern themselves
rather with the prediction of what government will do and how
government controls; and the Sociological School looks to the reaction of the country and the processes by which society can be engineered. Rodes prefers to see law as a rational dialogue between
community and government with accent on dialogue.
The expectations of government and community are articulated in rules. Though Rodes concedes that skeptics like Jerome
Frank are right not to consider rules as absolutes, he shows, by
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examples from Workmen's Compensation laws, that rules are efficient. His demonstration of the validity of rules provides him with
the occasion to point out how legal dialogues develop in the elaboration of arguments of litigants. Each contestant in the dialogue
grounds his expectations in rules which embody the principles upon
which his case rests. The government, too, uses its discretion in the
application of rules, principles and analyses; the community, as
either plaintiff or respondent, invokes the discretion of government;
in a word, the parties engage in a true exercise of dialogue.
Social control exercised by the state and acceptance of that
control by the community entails yet another kind of dialogue. The
government asserts a claim to obedience and the citizen weighs that
claim with the other demands that conscience makes on him. For
his part, the lawyer is often called upon to mediate this dialogue.
He tells his client what the law is and explains how the law fits into
his client's life. If just laws are to be obeyed and unjust laws are to
be disobeyed, upon whom does the burden of proof lie as to the
establishment of justice or injustice? Presumption of justice lies
with the law, some answer, so that the citizen must demonstrate the
immoral quality of the law. Others maintain that the state must
justify Vietnam wars and unjust prescriptions.
The legal enterprise is a many-faceted dialogue which provokes
the intervention of all interested parties: lawyers, judges, legislators, administrators, jurors, witnesses, plaintiffs, defendants, accusers, accuseds, clerks, bailiffs, turnkeys, even teachers and students
of law. All are embarked on a common and arduous enterprise and
must beat out solutions for the common good.
The community continuously develops its rules, principles and
analogies by the exploitation of its inner riches: religion, morality,
philosophy. Moral judgments have always entered into the legal
enterprise and still do, as for example, in the late resolution of the
segregation problem. The personal, moral, and religious determinations of the groups just mentioned contribute to the dialogue process. History, too, and social development have their word in legal
institutions as in the evolution of the duty of alimony to be paid by
a wife, the use in courts of other languages than English, the extent
of due process-for the simple reason that history and sociology tell
us what our people have become and are on the way to becoming.
Not the keeping of the peace nor preserving the political-economic system, but the promotion of the common good is the
purpose of law. Though this sounds like a mere restatement of
Thomas Aquinas' essential property of law, Rodes stakes out once
again his personal insight. He points out the hazards of determining
Published by eCommons, 1977
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the common good by standards of higher and lesser values, or some
quantitative theory. This observation leads him to a critique of
Utilitarianism-Bentham's greatest good for the greatest number.
Quantitative standards must yield, he is convinced, to value judgments on the quality of life. He suggests an approach balancing
individual versus social interests in order to reconcile the contradictory expectation of various elements in community. Social security
interest, buttressed by Brandeis' briefs have proved helpful in some
cases, but data is never enough when used independently of moral,
philosophical and historical considerations.
Rodes suggests a corrective of Thomas Aquinas' conditions for
a just law: (1) competent authority, (2) common good, and (3) equal
burdens on citizens. Rodes would phrase number two and three in
this way: [T]he common good is the pursuit of a good end by fair
means. A propos, civil disobedience (the refusal to obey an unjust
law), Rodes takes issue with a long line of thinkers, moralists and
jurists who concede the right to disobey a law that offends conscience, but do not allow the conscientious objector to go unpunished.
He would not accede to Abe Fortas' statement that "[ilt [peaceful
non-violent refusal to comply with the law] assumes that the
protester will be punished, and it requires peaceful submission to
punishment."'
Rodes' position on civil disobedience with regard to laws which
command or forbid, some might say, fringes anarchy, but on the
whole what he says coincides with the great tradition of moral principles on one's duty with respect to unjust laws.
The legal enterprise must not only care for personal needs but
must order the interpersonal relations that are common to human
society. Here Rodes touches upon the theme of Buber's I-Thou philosophy. He stresses the importance of bettering the social context,
the urgency of improving the quality of social life. In fact he manifests a concern throughout the work for the moral environment, in
which people are born, pass their lives and die. He calls attention
to the humanity that bottoms that practice of criminal law which
requires the presence of the accused and determines the selection
of a jury from among ordinary folk-people capable of sympathizing
with the accused-and at the same time of evaluating the accusation in all its comprehensiveness. Rodes maintains that the impersonal application of law increases or diminishes, as the case may be,
in proportion as the needs for efficiency, expertise, economics, soci1.
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ology and psychology, criteria and formality are recognized.
Rodes' analysis of love and marriage is heartening at a time
when one out of every three marriages ends in divorce. It is refreshing to hear the ring of the Portuguese's sonnet to Robert Browning
on true love in a context of how the law stands by marriage by
institutionalizing love and matrimony.
In homage to human dignity, Rodes thinks that law should
prohibit both the migration of poor people into affluent societies
unless the immigrants be integrated, and the touring of the rich in
impoverished lands, where accommodations have been created to
give the tourist the illusion that "this is just like home." He discovers other duties of the law to persons, protection of one's identity
with his own society, a person's desire to prolong his own personality
by expressing himself in property and contracts. Man's roots in land
and property must be safeguarded and above all the state should see
to it that a man may, if he wishes, realize his dreams. Rodes would
like to see tax considerations encourage individual craftsmanship
and small businesses, so that among the aims of government would
be counted job satisfaction.
The book closes with an interesting discussion of social and
commutative justice. Rodes contemplates a few cases where the two
seem to clash and decides in which circumstances social justice
should prevail and in which commutative justice should win out;
perhaps a more rewarding approach would be to show how these two
justices cooperate, mutually sustain each other in view of the common good. From the personal interest approach throughout the
work, to the final adhesion to the principles of subsidiarity, equality
and pluralism, Rodes' vision of a natural law philosophy emerges
clear and unmistakable, suffused with varying intensity of personalist and existentialist light.

Published by eCommons, 1977

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/16

